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CASE COMMENTS

different professions in a joint effort that will facilitate the determination
of what legal operations by laymen are actually permissible in the eyes of
Florida courts. The fact that the decree handed down by the court thoroughly
fills one of the gaps in the broad spectrum of unauthorized practice of law
case law is certainly a third result of no less significance since it will provide
lasting certainty in this area for both lawyers and laymen.
F. BROOK VOGHT

TAXATION: COMPANY'S BURDEN OF PROOF UNDER SECTION 531
Donruss Co. v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 501 (1969)
Don B. Weiner was the sole shareholder of the Donruss Company. From
1955 to 1961 the company's undistributed earnings increased from $1,021,288
to $1,670,315. During this period no dividends were paid. The company
paid Weiner a salary but made no loans to him nor any investments unrelated
to the business., The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed accumulated earnings tax against the company for the years 1960 and 1961. The
company paid the tax and brought this suit for refund. The trial judge
instructed the jury that in order for the tax to be imposed, tax avoidance
had to be "the purpose" for the accumulation. The jury found that the
accumulation was unreasonable but that the purpose was not tax avoidance.
Judgment was entered for the company. The Government appealed. The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 2 holding that the instruction was
erroneous in that the jury might have believed that tax avoidance must have
been the sole purpose for the accumulation. The court held that the proper
test was whether tax avoidance was the "dominant, impelling or controlling"
motive. The Government sought certiorari asserting that tax avoidance
need be only one of the purposes for the accumulation to justify the tax.
The United States Supreme Court HELD, that the proper test was whether
"one of the purposes" for accumulation was tax avoidance. Reversed and
remanded, Justices Harlan, Stewart, and Douglas concurring in part and
dissenting in part.
1. Treas. Reg. §1.533-1 (1959) warns that loans to shareholders or investments not
reasonably related to the business may be indicative of a purpose to avoid income taxes.
2. 384 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1967).
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Because of the graduated individual income tax rates, a corporation may
be used as a device to reduce the shareholders' individual income tax liability.
The accumulated earnings tax is imposed as a penalty to discourage stockholders from using the corporation for this purpose. For illustration, assume
that A is president and sole shareholder of X Corporation. A draws a $50,000
salary from the corporation and has income from other investments placing
him in the seventy per cent tax bracket. The corporation earns 5100,000
after taxes. If the corporation pays the $100,000 to A in dividends, A must
add that amount to his ordinary income. Thus, if the $100,000 is distributed
to him in dividends he must pay $70,000 of it in income tax, retaining only
$30,000. However, if the corporation were to accumulate the earnings instead
of distributing them, A would have several advantageous alternatives. Since
the corporation earns and accumulates $100,000 a year, the value of A's stock
will almost certainly increase by $100,000 a year. If at some future date A
were to sell his stock or if the corporation were dissolved, A would indirectly
realize the amount of earnings retained but he would pay taxes at capital
gains rates (25 per cent maximum) .3 Alternatively, he could postpone
dividend distribution until after he retired when he would be in a lower
tax bracket. It is clearly to A's advantage, then, to direct the corporation to
accumulate earnings instead of distributing them in dividends. The accumulated earnings tax is imposed as a penalty "to compel the company to
distribute any profits not needed for the conduct of the business so that
when distributed, individual stockholders will be liable" for taxes on the
dividends received.
The tax is imposed at the rate of 27.5 per cent on the accumulated
income not in excess of $100,000 and 38.5 per cent on the accumulated
income in excess of $100,000. 5 Credits against the tax may be taken for
that portion of the earnings retained for the reasonable needs of the business,
6
with a minimum lifetime credit of $100,000.
Section 532 (a) of the 1954 Code imposes the tax on every corporation
"formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect
to its shareholders...." The ultimate issue in the imposition of the tax is
purpose. 7 Purpose is a question of fact.8 The burden of proving, by the
preponderance of the evidence, that the accumulation of earnings was not
for the purpose of avoiding income tax is on the taxpayer. 9
In the instant case, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a
dispute among the circuits as to the extent to which tax avoidance must
have entered into the decision to accumulate. The First and Sixth Circuits

3. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, §1201.
4. Helvering v. Chicago Stock Yards Co., 318 U.S. 693, 699 (1943).
5. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §531.
6. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §535 (c).
7. Shaw-Walker Co., v. Commissioner, 390 F.2d 205, 214 (6th Cir. 1968); World Publishing Co. v. United States, 169 F.2d 186, 187 (10th Cir. 1948).
8. Kirlin Corp. v. Commissioner, 361 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1966); Egan, Inc. v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 343 (8th Cir. 1956).
9. Young Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 339 F.2d 481 (1st Cir. 1964).
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had held that the tax would not be imposed if tax avoidance was not the
"dominant purpose" of the taxpayer. 10 The Eighth and Tenth Circuits required that tax avoidance be "one of the determining purposes" of the taxpayer. 1 The Second and Fifth Circuits had rejected the "dominant purpose"
test.' 2 The United States Supreme Court has settled the controversy in the present decision by holding that tax avoidance need be but "one of the purposes"
of the taxpayer to justify the imposition of the accumulated earnings tax. The
Court emphasized the reasonableness of the accumulation as the most significant factor in the incidence of the tax. The Court said that reasonableness
is a much more objective inquiry, and susceptible of more effective scrutiny,
than are the vagaries of corporate motive.' 3 Thus, the Court attenuated the
motive factor, allowing imposition of the tax if tax avoidance was but "one
of the purposes" of the taxpayer.
Even though the determinative question in the imposition of the tax
is purpose, the cases have usually been resolved on the question of reasonableness of the accumulation.' 4 As a practical matter, the taxpayer can prove
lack of tax avoidance purpose only by proving that his purpose was something
else, generally meeting the financial needs of the business. Furthermore,
section 535 (a) of the Code allows the taxpayer a credit against the tax for
that portion of earnings reasonably accumulated. On the other hand, if the
accumulation is found to be unreasonable, it is sufficiently determinative of
a tax avoidance purpose to justify imposition of the tax. 5 Thus, even before
the present decision the single most important issue was the reasonableness
of the accumulation. The present decision, however, all but extinguishes
the element of motive behind the accumulation as a determinative issue. 16
7
In practice the tax is generally applied only to closely held corporations
in which shareholders characteristically take an active part in decisionmaking.
Under the "dominant purpose" test even if the trier of fact, with the benefit
of hindsight, determines that the accumulation was unreasonable, he could
still conclude that the taxpayer was not primarily motivated by tax avoidance,' 8 that is, that the taxpayer was more businessman than tax dodger.
However, under the "one of the purposes" test, if the trier of fact concludes
that the accumulation was unreasonable, then he must impose the tax unless
10. Donruss Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 292, 298 (6th Cir. 1967); Young Motor Co.
v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 481 (1st Cir. 1964).
11. Kerr Cochran, Inc. v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 121, 123 (8th Cir. 1958); World
Publishing Co. v. United States, 169 F.2d 186, 189 (10th Cir. 1948).
12. Barrow Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir. 1961); Trico Products
Corp. v. Commissioner, 137 F.-2d 424, 426 (2d Cir. 1943).
13. 89 S. Ct. at 507.
14. See, e.g., Shaw-Walker Co., 24 CCH TAx CT. MEm. 1709 (1965); Ted Bates & Co.,
24 CCH TAx Or. MFs. 1346 (1965).
15. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §533.

16. 89 S. Ct. at 508. Although the Court insisted that it "cannot subscribe to respondent's suggestion that our holding would make purpose totally irrelevant," it seems

clear that the question of motive will, in practice, be reached only inferentially through
the objective test of reasonableness.
17. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. at 69 (1954).
18. E.g., United States v. Duke Laboratories, Inc., 337 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1964).
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the officer-shareholder has proved that a substantial tax advantage, of which
he was unquestionably aware, did not even enter into his decision to accumulate. In the words of the Court: "It is still open for the taxpayer to show
that even though knowledge of the tax consequences was present, that
knowledge did not contribute to the decision to accumulate earnings."' 19 If
evidence has been presented that the officer-shareholder realized a sizable
personal tax savings, 20 this avenue is narrow indeed. The Supreme Court
has thus made the "objective" test of reasonableness effectively the sole test
in imposing the tax. But how objective is the objective test?
Consider that dividend decisions are based on considerations that are
peculiarly within the province of opinion, such as trends in the industry and
the economy in general, anticipated price changes, and anticipated working
capital requirements. Consider, too, that the trier of fact may have but a
limited understanding of the import of the account balances, fund statements,
and other accounting data presented as evidence. For example, at the outset
of one case before the Tax Court, the court said that the fact that a portion
of retained earnings had been capitalized by a stock dividend was "pretty
persuasive evidence" that the company was21subject to the tax but that "maybe"
the taxpayer could prove to the contrary.
It is often alleged that revenue agents threaten to assert section 531
22
The
deficiencies as a weapon to obtain agreement on other deficiencies.
Second Circuit has noted that section 531 is a factor in inducing closely held
corporations to go public or sell out to giant corporations. The court
indicated that the Commissioner must not attempt to use section 531 as
an ex post facto veto over the board of directors of the corporation lest the
Internal Revenue Service and the Anti-Trust Division be working at cross
23
purposes.
4
If a corporation is to grow and expand it must retain earnings.2 The
question of reasonableness of the accumulation at best pits the judgment
of the businessman against that of the trier of fact on a question that is
peculiarly within the province of opinion. Without a margin for honest
minds to disagree, section 531 may become excessively restrictive on the
business community.
JOHN O'BRIEN

19. 89 S. Ct. 501, 508 (1969).
20. Such evidence is admissible, United States v. Duke Laboratories, Inc., 337 F.2d
280 (2d Cir. 1964).
21. See Sears Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 359 F.2d 191, 196 (2d Cir. 1966), rev'g 24 CCH
TAx CT. MEM. 207 (1965). Although the capitalization of retained earnings by a stock
dividend restricts the legal authority to declare dividends, it has no effect on the ability
of a corporation to pay dividends. It is merely an accounting entry.
22.

B.

BrrTKER & J.

EusTIcE,

FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

OF CORPORATIONS AND

SHARE-

HOLDERS 211 n.3 (2d ed. 1966).
23. Electric Regulator Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1964).
24. See H. SIMONS & W. KARRENBROCK, INTERMFDiATE AccOuNrTING (1964) for general
accounting principles.
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